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制度经济学视角下财政监督制度的研究

时间:2022-07-06 来源:未知 编辑:梦想论文 阅读:
1、 System integration theory
 
1. Theoretical overview
 
North believes that system is a kind of rule applicable to society, which controls the existence of human relations in society. It is Hayek's thought to regard the expression of spontaneous order as system. Here we focus on the institutional structure theory of Ke Wugang and Shi Manfei, which divides the system into external and internal. The internal system considers practical experience and social culture, and is spontaneous; The external system emphasizes that its content is rigid and regulated.
 
The external and internal fusion or conflict reflects the efficiency of the system. Institution is considered to be a key issue in economic development, because institution itself can form an incentive mechanism to make people more actively participate in economic activities in order to realize the optimization of resource allocation. If the external system can be recognized by the personnel according to the regulations, there is no need for others to supervise, and the implementation will also form spontaneously, which will greatly reduce the transaction cost. This shows that the integration of internal and external systems can achieve the most efficient institutional provisions. On the contrary, the conflict between external system and internal system will weaken the effective implementation of external system rules and reduce the efficiency of the system.
 
2. Integration analysis of financial supervision system
 
Ignoring the internal system and relying solely on the external system, the system is inefficient and the effect is not obvious. If the internal and external systems are well integrated, the efficiency of the system will be greatly improved. The financial supervision system we usually pay attention to and think about is a chivalrous system, which belongs to the external system in the broad institutional structure. First of all, whether in a broad sense or chivalrous, our purpose is very clear, that is, to effectively prevent violations of laws and disciplines in the financial field, and prevent financial risks.
 
In the macro financial supervision system, the external system is realized by a series of laws and regulations. These rigid rules require the object of supervision not to make mistakes, not to violate the rules, and also require the subject of supervision to implement the responsibility of supervision over the object. In many previous research documents on financial supervision, many scholars have talked about one of the problems of the financial supervision system: the supervision subject is also the supervision object, so the supervision sometimes fails. The author believes that this problem is not the main reason for the failure of the financial supervision system. In the financial supervision system, both the supervision subject and its object are the normative objects in the system. As an object with the attribute of "social man", it is bound to be constrained and influenced by the internal systems such as social values, traditional cultural values, personal values and so on. When these internal systems play a role that just deviates from the rigid constraints of the external and internal systems of the financial supervision system, forming a conflict, the macro financial supervision will be ineffective, and the institutional efficiency can not be talked about. In reality, some of our government officials, as the regulated objects in the financial supervision system, are influenced by the values of social money supremacy and material supremacy, the corrupt ideas of "being an official is greedy", "not greedy for nothing", and even the influence of some corrupt informal organizations or individuals in government organizations, completely ignoring external institutional constraints, and taking risks and violating laws and disciplines in the financial field. Of course, there is also the attitude of many people in society to tolerate and accept official corruption, treating officials and corrupt officials alike, which seriously undermines the establishment of the internal system.
 
If the external system is a rigid rule requirement, then the internal system is a flexible and soft cultural consciousness. We can also understand the external system as passive restraint after the event, and the internal system as proactive prevention in advance. Moreover, the internal system and external system must be integrated and play a role together in order to truly achieve efficiency and effectiveness. In the financial supervision system, both internal and external systems are indispensable. To some extent, the two complement and cooperate with each other. Because it is impossible to completely eliminate the seeds and ideas of violating laws and disciplines in the financial field through preventive tools such as internal systems, even if the cost of the financial supervision system can be quite low; However, it is still not enough to rely solely on external systems to play a role in financial supervision. As analyzed above, it will produce a phenomenon similar to the "failure" of the government.
 
2、 Principal agent theory
 
1. Theoretical overview
 
The principal-agent theory is one of the main contents of the contract theory of institutional economics. Its literature research began with Coase's publication of the nature of enterprises in 1937. The principal-agent relationship originated from the existence of "specialization". In the history of modern enterprise development, there has been the separation of owners and managers. Operators have professional operation and management capabilities. In "specialization", there may be a relationship in which the agent acts on behalf of the principal due to its comparative advantage. The concept of principal-agent in modern sense was first put forward by Ross: "if both parties, one of the agents exercises some decision-making power on behalf of the interests of the principal, the agency relationship will arise." The principal-agent theory analyzes the principal-agent relationship within and between enterprises from the perspective of traditional microeconomics. It is superior to general microeconomics in explaining some organizational phenomena.

In the research of principal-agent theory, there are two inevitable problems when the principal-agent forms a contractual relationship: first, the principal's goal will deviate from the agent's goal; Secondly, there are differences in information between the principal and the agent, that is, information asymmetry.
 
2. Principal agent analysis of financial supervision system
 
The principal-agent problem in enterprises has a relatively simple relationship, which is directly manifested as the principal and agent. In government organizations, the relationship between principal-agent problems will be slightly more complex. As a client, the government hires and entrusts public servants to manage daily government affairs, but as the representative of the people, the government is also an agent. Then there will be two principal-agent behaviors. The goals of the people must be reflected in the performance of public interests. Because of the deviation of goals and information asymmetry, the government, as its agent, cannot fully express public preferences. When specific public servants perform their duties as agents, deviations and information asymmetry will occur again.
 
In our financial system, the central government's preference for the public cannot be fully grasped, so when formulating fiscal policies, the use of financial funds cannot be properly and efficiently used to meet public needs; When the central government transfers payments to local governments, the goals of local governments and the central government will more or less appear deviation and information asymmetry; The principal-agent problem between the local government and its specific public servants has formed three principal-agent problems.
 
In the development of modern business, to solve the principal-agent problem is to solve the incentive means and improve the supervision information technology. We have analyzed the incentive problem before. Here we mainly study and solve the problem of information asymmetry. In the financial system, in recent years, the state has issued some relevant policies to ensure the disclosure of financial information at all levels of government, which plays a great role in solving the problem of information asymmetry. In the development of western financial industry, the information asymmetry between financial institutions and between financial institutions and ordinary people is very serious. In this way, there will be market failure, and various moral hazard and adverse selection problems will follow. Of course, when there are problems in the market, government intervention often becomes very important. In dealing with the problem of information asymmetry in the financial market, the government often introduces some strong rules and regulations to force some financial institutions to regulate their behavior and truthfully disclose their financial information or related information involving many interests. It is undeniable that complete information transparency and information symmetry cannot be achieved. But we should pursue a state that is the most basic and tends to complete information symmetry as far as possible. When we think again about the government organization, its financial system, when its own failure, information is completely asymmetric, how can the government consciously disclose its real financial revenue and expenditure to the society in detail and transparently? Only when the government makes the financial accounting details public, so that taxpayers can clearly know whether the money is used or not, and whether it is used correctly, can it play the role of financial supervision of the whole society.
 
3、 Enlightenment
 
In the past research and study, we often received suggestions from the public, the judiciary, the media and other aspects to strengthen the supervision of "supervision". However, institutional economics gives us a new perspective. We can find the need to form a financial supervision system from the theory of institutional integration. We should pay attention to the internal system and the integration of internal and external. After all, only when the whole society has a zero tolerance attitude towards corruption and people who ignore public property and interests, can everyone tacitly form a conscious internal soul guidance, making the contradiction between internal and external systems tend to be infinitesimal; From the principal-agent theory, we find that we need to use the financial supervision tool -- information disclosure.

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