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如何解决民办高校的教师聘用问题

时间:2021-08-30 来源:未知 编辑:梦想论文 阅读:
The relationship between private colleges and teachers is a kind of contractual relationship based on educational service. The two sides through the appointment of the school and the appointment of teachers on the rights and obligations. It can be said that the correct handling of the relationship between schools and teachers has become an important measure to ensure the quality of education in the educational management system. According to the theory of incomplete contract, the employment contract is not complete. This kind of incomplete will lead to the opportunism behavior of both parties and the ineffectiveness of contract governance. Therefore, it is of great practical significance for the further implementation of the reform of personnel system of private colleges and universities to further promote the development of China's higher education.
 
First, private colleges and universities teacher employment contract is not complete
 
According to the degree of completeness of the contract terms, the new institutional economics can be divided into complete contract and incomplete contract. A complete contract is a contract that covers all the possible conditions in the course of the performance of the contract. Incomplete contract is the lack of the terms of the contract, the contract has not been assigned to the rights and not listed matters. The incomplete of the contract means that it is difficult for both parties to make a very detailed provision in advance. [1]16., the private university in our country has been carrying out the teacher appointment system since its inception.
 
Private colleges and universities employ teachers to complete the task of teaching and scientific research, private university teachers to obtain the appropriate remuneration based on the quality of their tasks. Therefore, the relationship between private colleges and teachers is essentially a contractual relationship based on contract management. As Coase said:
 
"Because of the difficulty of forecasting, the longer the duration of the contract for the supply of goods or services, it is impossible for the buyer to make it clear that the other party should do what is wrong." [2]391 in private college teachers'appointment contract, because of limited rationality, the ambiguous reasons of transaction cost, information asymmetry and language use, to complete the contract is impossible, therefore, private college teacher employment contract is not completely necessary.
 
The limited rationality of the parties
 
Because of the complexity of the external environment and the limitation of human computing power and cognitive ability, human behavior is limited rational. The appointment of the parties to the contract, due to the complexity and uncertainty of external environment, coupled with the knowledge, experience and the cost is limited, private universities and teachers can anticipate the contract situations in the process, so it is impossible to formulate corresponding measures for various contingencies occur in the process of performing the contract. In this case, both parties can only make limited commitments in the employment contract.
 
(two) transaction costs
 
Kos believes that the premise of complete contract is zero transaction costs, but in the real world, the transaction cost is [3]322. in this case, in order to avoid short-term contract caused by the transaction costs, the parties will choose to sign long-term contracts. In order to reduce the transaction costs arising from the re signing of the contract, the private colleges and universities will sign a contract with the teacher for three years. The growth of the term of the contract makes it difficult for the parties to specify in detail the future situation and the corresponding countermeasures.
 
(three) information asymmetry
 
Because of the limited rationality of the parties, the information between the private colleges and the teachers is asymmetric. On the one hand, private colleges and universities can only rely on the information of the job seekers to make the appointment decision; on the other hand, the job seekers also lack the understanding of the school practice, hidden rules, historical traditions, such as implicit in the school system.
 
(four) fuzziness of language use
 
Because any language itself is incomplete, imprecise, so language statements of any complex events are likely to be fuzzy [4]159. so that more of the terms of the contract, contract disputes appear more.
 
To sum up, because of limited rationality, the private college teachers'appointment contract on both sides of the transaction cost, ambiguous reasons of information asymmetry and language use for the suppression of the parties to the transaction of rational choice, leading to employment contract will inevitably miss some unexpected situations and corresponding solutions to some, because the cost is too high to make clear the vague terms. Therefore, compared to the complete contract including all probable situation, teachers in private colleges employment contract is not complete, is a kind of incomplete contract.
 
Two, private colleges and Universities Teachers in the contract of the existence of risk
 
That the theory of incomplete contract, transaction in order to smooth transaction specific investment before signing the contract, the value of the specific investment in the contract relation is greater than the value of the contract, thus forming for quasi rents. However, these specific ex ante investment but not included in the contract, once the relationship specific investment both sides have been locked, the other party may use this part of the opportunistic behavior of investors rent [5]11. plunder in order to deal with this problem, on the one hand, the parties may through reduce the specific investment to avoid risks; on the other hand the contract, the parties may also in negotiations, the use of specific assets of "bundling" effect, threatened to suspend a contract, which directly increase revenue [6]34.
 
The organization is capital and human capital of the special physical teachers in Colleges and universities and [7]174. due to the incomplete private college teachers'appointment contract, whether in schools or teachers, specific human capital will bring appropriable quasi rents. This kind of occupation quasi rent makes the transaction between the two sides of the behavior of the machine from possible to reality. On the one hand, for schools, due to the need to take the tendency, the school will be listed in the contract of employment favorable terms of the school, and the fuzzy treatment of some sensitive issues in order to avoid responsibility. This makes the ownership of the contract unclear. The result is that the reasonable rights should belong to the teachers because of the lack of effective protection or the protection of the cost is too high to be able to protect. In this case, when the teacher found the proceeds of assets investment and effort are not equal, the most economical option is to reduce its own transfer out right or possession of more rights of the other party. Therefore, teachers in order to reduce their loss will be lazy at work, reduce the effective supply of their own labor, so as to reduce the income risk may increase the damage caused by the [8]88 -90. on the other hand, for teachers, the investment of human capital is free to control, therefore, teachers can easily be part of their own the hidden human capital and idle. Other people can not detect this part of the hidden and idle human capital, it can not be exploited. If teachers do not work in the work force, under normal circumstances, it is difficult to give strong evidence that the school teachers labor supply is not complete. However, due to the provisions of the contract in respect of the remuneration of the provisions are often very clear, therefore, the school must be in accordance with the provisions of the contract in full payment of labor remuneration. That is to say, the teacher has the right to be lazy and the school has the obligation to pay the labor remuneration in accordance with the contract. In this case, in order to reduce the loss, the school will take the way to reduce the teacher's labor remuneration. However, the results of this will tend to stimulate teachers to lower labor input, thus forming a vicious cycle, eventually leading to a high level of teachers leave the school, while the low level of teachers can be retained.
 
Three, private colleges and universities teacher employment contract management
 
Because of the incomplete contract of the appointment of teachers in private colleges and universities, both sides of the contract will adopt various strategies for their own interests. Taking into account the limited rationality, opportunism and asset specificity, resorting to the third party to maintain the contractual relationship is not only costly, but may not be able to achieve. This requires a governance structure to regulate the order, the transfer of conflict, to achieve the common interests of both sides in order to minimize the loss of efficiency caused by incomplete contracts [9]171 -195.
 
First of all, for the appointment of the parties to the contract, whether the opportunism behavior depends on the opportunism behavior of the benefits are greater than the cost, so the increase in their profits or raise the cost of default is the maintenance contract is stable, credible commitment to ensure that key. Therefore, it is necessary to determine the income distribution between the two colleges and universities according to the asset specificity. As the actual provider of teaching and research in Colleges and universities, the efficiency of teachers in teaching and research is not the same, the effect is not the same. This kind of teaching and scientific research ability is decided by the special nature of the teacher's human capital, and this kind of specificity determines the game result of the teacher's human capital and the school physical property. The higher the ability of teaching and research teachers with special human capital advantage, this advantage makes the school physical assets in a subordinate position; on the contrary, the lower the teachers' ability of teaching and research, the specific human capital at a disadvantage, so it is a high degree of dependence on school assets. So, the higher ability of teaching and research in Colleges and universities and occupied the dominant position in the production of teachers should be teachers of residual control rights; and for the ability of teaching and research in Colleges and universities is low in production in the subordinate position shall be borne by the university assets owner occupation of residual control rights [10]18.
 
Secondly, the private colleges and universities should be the reputation of the constraints. "Private Education Promotion Law" third stipulates: "private education is a public welfare undertakings, is an integral part of socialist education." The public welfare property determines the income is not the market of private universities, and should be based on the academic status and academic reputation and other non market benefits; for university teachers, in addition to the benefits of monetary income, including academic reputation, academic status and other non monetary income of [11]165. in the extraction of revenue between the commonfactor after use reputation constraints both sides opportunism is a feasible method. Adam Simy believes that although each transaction subject has egoistic nature, but the need for repeated transactions can often opportunistic behavior effectively constraint the principal transactions, so that they become honest and trustworthy [12]247. appointment on the parties to the contract, reputation restriction is mainly to constrain [13]29. universities and teachers to participate in market transactions to opportunistic behavior again through "choice the signal for low cost of the potential of universities and job seekers"
 
Finally, because of the nature of the contract is an incomplete contract, there are too many uncertainties in the contract. When these uncertainties occur, the actual implementation of the contract will become very difficult. In this case, the arbitration clause should be stipulated in the contract. For the process of the implementation of the contract can not be resolved in consultation with the matter, the use of expert arbitration governance. In order to ensure the objective and impartial arbitration, arbitration experts have no direct relationship with the foreign scholars, and through random selection method.
 
Four. Conclusion
 
The relationship between private colleges and teachers is a kind of contractual relationship. Because of the limited rationality, transaction cost, information asymmetry and vagueness of language use, the employment contract is not complete. The contract is incomplete, which stimulates the opportunism of both parties, and the quasi rent which is brought by the specificity of human capital makes it possible to turn the opportunistic behavior into reality. The incomplete nature of the teacher engagement contract makes the two sides of the transaction reduce the specific investment amount of the ex ante relationship because of the fear of the opportunistic behavior, which leads to the inefficiency of investment. In order to minimize the loss of efficiency caused by incomplete contract, it is necessary to manage the private teacher employment contract. First of all, should be based on the specificity of the assets of the two sides to determine the income distribution between the two. Secondly, the private colleges and universities for the reputation of the constraints. Finally, it is necessary to ensure the fairness of the employment contract disputes by means of expert arbitration.
 
Reference
 
[1] Su Qilin. Recent advances in the theory and application of incomplete contracts [J]. foreign economics and management, 2005 (9): 16
 
[2] Coase, R. Nature of Firm[J]. Economica, 1937 (4): 391 (The) the
 
[3] coase. On the institutional structure of production [M]. Chen Yu, translation. Shanghai: Sanlian bookstore, 1994:322.
 
[4] Yuan Qingming. New institutional economics [M]. Shanghai: Fudan University press, 2012: 159
 
[5] Dai Jugui. The essence of the hold up problem and its solution [J]. Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, 2011 (4): 11
 
[6] Zhou Zhimin, Huang Yujie. Causes, risks and coping mechanisms of incomplete contracts [J]. Chinese and foreign entrepreneurs, 2007 (12): 34
 
[7] high ridge. Research on educational property rights system: an analysis framework based on New Institutional Economics [M]. Guilin: Guangxi Normal University press
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